Skills/PyPI/mseep-whissle-mcp

mseep-whissle-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Whissle MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mseep · publishing for 578 daysInstalls 13Last detonated 43 h ago
$claude mcp add mseep-whissle-mcp -- uvx mseep-whissle-mcp
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Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
WHISSLE_AUTH_TOKEN or --auth-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: WHISSLE_MCP_BASE_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for WHISSLE_AUTH_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mseep-whissle-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathswhissle_mcp/__main__.py:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint(" 3. Add WHISSLE_AUTH_TOKEN to your .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 1,008 lines in 15 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈43 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mseep-whissle-mcp@0.1.0 as of 42 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.