Skills/PyPI/mseep-tdengine-mcp-server

mseep-tdengine-mcp-server@0.0.10

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Add your description here" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mseep-support · publishing for 578 daysInstalls 18Last detonated 43 h ago
$claude mcp add mseep-tdengine-mcp-server -- uvx mseep-tdengine-mcp-server
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TDENGINE_PASSWORD or --taos-passwordConfiguration, not credentials: TDENGINE_DATABASE, TDENGINE_HOST, TDENGINE_PORT, TDENGINE_TIMEOUT, TDENGINE_USERNAME, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso taosdata.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names taosdata.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TDENGINE_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mseep-tdengine-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.md:185 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file4. Enable debug mode by setting `LOG_LEVEL` in your configurationFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentsrc/tdengine_mcp_server/server.py:121 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloads# https://docs.taosdata.com/2.6/reference/rest-api/#http-%E8%BF%94%E5%9B%9E%E6%A0%BC%E5%BC%8FFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mseep-tdengine-mcp-server@0.0.10 as of 43 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.