Skills/PyPI/mseep-mcp-foundry

mseep-mcp-foundry@0.1.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for Azure AI Foundry (experimental)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mseep-support · publishing for 578 daysInstalls 22Last detonated 2d ago
$claude mcp add mseep-mcp-foundry -- uvx mseep-mcp-foundry
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AZURE_AI_PROJECT_ENDPOINT, AZURE_OPENAI_API_VERSION, AZURE_OPENAI_DEPLOYMENT, AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT, DEFAULT_AGENT_ID, EVAL_DATA_DIR, LABS_API_URL, SWAGGER_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso azure.com, azurewebsites.net, azureml.ms — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names azure.com, azurewebsites.net, azureml.ms as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mseep-mcp-foundry

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_foundry/__main__.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileshelp='Path to .env file (default: .env)')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_foundry/__main__.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument('--envFile', required=False, default='.env',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_foundry/mcp_foundry_model/utils.py:330 · Python subprocess execution detectedoutput = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_foundry/mcp_foundry_evaluation/tools.py:369 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_foundry/mcp_foundry_finetuning/swagger.py:413 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.info("SWAGGER_PATH not set in .env file, skipping swagger tool registration")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_foundry/mcp_foundry_finetuning/tools.py:125 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"hint": "Ensure SWAGGER_PATH is set in your .env file"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_foundry/mcp_foundry_finetuning/tools.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"hint": "Ensure SWAGGER_PATH is set in your .env file"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 34 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mseep-mcp-foundry@0.1.1 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.