Skills/PyPI/mseep-lucidity-mcp

mseep-lucidity-mcp@0.1.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "An AI powered code review tool for MCP" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher hyperbliss · publishing for 432 daysInstalls 17Last detonated 2d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslucidity/server.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.debug("No .env file found, using system environment variables")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslucidity/server.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load environment variables from .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlucidity/tools/code_analysis.py:42 · Python subprocess execution detectedgit_root = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslucidity/server.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslucidity/server.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Look for .env in current directory and parent directoriesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslucidity/server.py:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = script_dir / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Script disguised as a text filedocs/llms-full.txt contains a shell or batch script# Example Clients Source: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/clients A list of applications that support MCP integrations Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlucidity/tools/code_analysis.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detecteddiff = subprocess.run(diff_command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlucidity/tools/code_analysis.py:64 · Python subprocess execution detectedstaged = subprocess.run(staged_command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/llms-full.txt:1549 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file3. Monitor root accessibilityFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlucidity/tools/code_analysis.py:107 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "diff", "--name-only"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlucidity/tools/code_analysis.py:114 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "diff", "--cached", "--name-only"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈49 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mseep-lucidity-mcp@0.1.2 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hyperbliss: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Script disguised as a text file≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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