Skills/PyPI/mseep-fastmcp-threatintel

mseep-fastmcp-threatintel@0.2.9

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "🛡️ MCP AI Powered Threat Intelligence - Revolutionizing Cybersecurity | Built by Arjun Trivedi (4R9UN)" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher 4r9un · publishing for 509 daysInstalls 15Last detonated 2d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ABUSEIPDB_API_KEYDOCKER_TOKENIPINFO_API_KEYOTX_API_KEYPYPI_TOKENTEST_PYPI_TOKENVIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso virustotal.com, alienvault.com, abuseipdb.com, ipinfo.io, astral.sh, codecov.io, docker.com, d3js.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names virustotal.com, alienvault.com, abuseipdb.com, ipinfo.io, astral.sh, codecov.io, docker.com, d3js.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY, DOCKER_TOKEN, IPINFO_API_KEY, OTX_API_KEY, PYPI_TOKEN, TEST_PYPI_TOKEN, VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mseep-fastmcp-threatintel

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 1: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.3sprocessexited 1: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:141 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat > .env << 'EOF'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f ".env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/cli.py:431 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif not Confirm.ask(".env file already exists. Overwrite?"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install.sh:80 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo pacman -S --noconfirm gitFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install.sh:76 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y gitFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/settings.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Search for and load .env file from common locations."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/cli.py:428 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Check if .env file existsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install.sh:57 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/cli.py:429 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = Path(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/cli.py:464 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Write .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:140 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint_status "Creating .env file..."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:158 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint_success ".env file created"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:138 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env file if it doesn't existFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/settings.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Check for .env file in each pathFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install.sh:78 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo yum install -y gitFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:196 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$HOME/Desktop/FastMCP-ThreatIntel.desktop"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install.sh:57 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/settings.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv_path = path / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/settings.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.info(f"Loaded .env file from: {dotenv_path}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:43 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:15 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:59 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chown -R threatintel:threatintel /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/threatintel/settings.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.info("No .env file found in common locations.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈69 tok
1 file · 30 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mseep-fastmcp-threatintel@0.2.9 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 4r9un: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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