Skills/PyPI/mseep-arcade-mcp

mseep-arcade-mcp@1.5.9

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Arcade.dev - Tool Calling platform for Agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mseep-support · publishing for 578 daysInstalls 10Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mseep-arcade-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandMakefile:228 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions@chmod +x ./uv_setup.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsuv_setup.sh:284 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env file if it doesn't existFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsuv_setup.sh:261 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"python.envFile": "\${workspaceFolder}/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternuv_setup.sh:94 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsuv_setup.sh:287 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif confirm "Would you like to create an .env file?" "y"; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsuv_setup.sh:288 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "# Environment variables for the project" > .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detecteddocker/Dockerfile:20 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/docker-compose.yml:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescommand: /bin/arcade-engine --config /bin/engine.yaml --env /bin/.env --migrateFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsuv_setup.sh:285 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f ".env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/docker-compose.yml:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- ./.env:/bin/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathslibs/tests/cli/test_secret.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Test loading a basic .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddocker/Dockerfile:73 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod +x /app/start.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternuv_setup.sh:90 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelluv_setup.sh:94 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathslibs/tests/cli/test_secret.py:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Test loading .env file with inline comments."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathslibs/tests/cli/test_secret.py:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswith tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode="w", suffix=".env", delete=False) as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelluv_setup.sh:90 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathslibs/tests/cli/test_secret.py:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Test loading .env file with quoted values."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanduv_setup.sh:338 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x activate.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathslibs/tests/cli/test_secret.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswith tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode="w", suffix=".env", delete=False) as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mseep-arcade-mcp@1.5.9 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mseep-support: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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