Skills/PyPI/moysklad-mcp-ru

moysklad-mcp-ru@0.2.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the MoySklad JSON API 1.2 (schema-driven, safety-gated, document writes)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ilyautov · publishing for 134 daysInstalls 486Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso wildberries.ru, python.org, moysklad.ru — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx moysklad-mcp-ru

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/__init__.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/entities.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/entities.yaml · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/errors.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/registry.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/safety.py
0.3sfilesystemread ~/.config/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json outside project
0.3sfilesystemwrote ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/__init__.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/entities.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/entities.yaml · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/errors.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/registry.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/safety.py
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.4sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5sfilesystemread ~/.config/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json outside project
0.5sfilesystemwrote ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/__init__.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/entities.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/entities.yaml · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/errors.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/registry.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/safety.py
0.7sfilesystemread ~/.config/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json outside project
0.7sfilesystemwrote ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/__init__.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/entities.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/entities.yaml · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/errors.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/registry.py · ~/.moysklad-mcp/app/core/safety.py
0.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcore/tools.py:623 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfrom chat without editing files. Keys are stored locally (chmod 600)."""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcore/tools.py:694 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsis reported. Saved locally (chmod 600), never echoed back.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcore/tools.py:663 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsSaved to ~/.marketplace-mcp/cabinets.json (local, chmod 600), never echoed.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.py:236 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"Token is saved to ~/.moysklad-mcp/cabinets.json (local, chmod 600), never to the repo.\n"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_credentials_hardening.py:26 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# POSIX file modes don't translate to Windows (chmod is a near-no-op there).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedserve.py:61 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscore/client.py:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import CredentialStoreFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcore/credentials.py:7 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsStorage: ``~/.marketplace-mcp/cabinets.json`` (outside the repo, chmod 600).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 62 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for moysklad-mcp-ru@0.2.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ilyautov: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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