Skills/PyPI/moodle-mcp-bridge

moodle-mcp-bridge@1.7.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing a Moodle site as 88 typed AI tools: read courses, grades and deadlines; build courses, quizzes, questions and content." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nmaaalhawary · publishing for 114 daysInstalls 48Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add moodle-mcp-bridge -- uvx moodle-mcp-bridge
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MOODLE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MOODLE_ALLOW_WRITE, MOODLE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso example.edu — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names example.edu as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MOODLE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx moodle-mcp-bridge

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:191 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction filedesktop (developer mode), Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code Copilot agent mode, Cline,Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmoodle_mcp/server.py:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor _candidate in (_here / ".env", _here.parent / ".env", Path.cwd() / ".env"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmoodle_mcp/server.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Look for a .env next to this module, in its parent (the repo checkoutFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:95 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file| Admin access (yours or an admin's) | To install the plugin, enable web services, and create the token |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmoodle_mcp/server.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load a .env sitting next to this file so the server works regardless of theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexclude = [".env", "__pycache__", "*.pyc"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:191 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction filedesktop (developer mode), Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code Copilot agent mode, Cline,Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈73 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for moodle-mcp-bridge@1.7.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.