Skills/PyPI/momcp-tui

momcp-tui@26.10.633

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A TUI-based multi-MCP tool orchestrator written in Python." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher andyjin-2358155969 · publishing for 109 daysInstalls 56Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ARK_API_KEYEXA_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYPARALLEL_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ComSpec, MOMCP_WEBSEARCH_PROVIDER, OPENCODE_WEBSEARCH_PROVIDER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso deepseek.com, aliyuncs.com, moonshot.cn, minimaxi.com, volces.com, bigmodel.cn, xiaomimimo.com, aliyun.com, volcengine.com, kimi.com, exa.ai, parallel.ai, opencode.ai, tsinghua.edu.cn, andyjin.website — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names deepseek.com, aliyuncs.com, moonshot.cn, minimaxi.com, volces.com, bigmodel.cn, xiaomimimo.com, aliyun.com, volcengine.com, kimi.com, exa.ai, parallel.ai, opencode.ai, tsinghua.edu.cn, andyjin.website as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ARK_API_KEY, EXA_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, PARALLEL_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx momcp-tui

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/momcp_tui/ui_app.py:1133 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(pip_cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/momcp_tui/config.py:349 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslines.append(f"[mcp.servers.{server_name}.env]")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/momcp_tui/utils/locale.py:453 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering"api_modal_ph": "Enter your API KEY",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_permission.py:58 · Destructive file system command detectedassert evaluate("shell", "rm -rf /tmp/x", rules).action == DENYFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/momcp_tui/utils/clipboard.py:20 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, input=text.encode("utf-8"), check=False, timeout=3)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_permission.py:44 · Destructive file system command detectedrule = evaluate("shell", "rm -rf /")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/momcp_tui/mcp/server.py:396 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_ui_permission.py:53 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceaction, _ = app._needs_permission("momcp", "run_command", {"command": "rm -rf /"})Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_ui_permission.py:53 · Destructive file system command detectedaction, _ = app._needs_permission("momcp", "run_command", {"command": "rm -rf /"})Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/momcp_tui/ui_app.py:2905 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(pip_cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/momcp_tui/mcp/server.py:116 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesDetection is token/substring based so ``cd /tmp && sudo rm -rf x`` cannotFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_permission.py:44 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicerule = evaluate("shell", "rm -rf /")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_permission.py:105 · Destructive file system command detectedassert evaluate("shell", "rm -rf /", rules).action == DENYFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/momcp_tui/utils/secrets.py:102 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionskey in ``.secret_key`` chmod 0600. A copied store without the key file isFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/momcp_tui/utils/locale.py:467 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering"key_input_hint": "Enter your API KEY, press Enter to save (/cancel to abort)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_ui_permission.py:41 · Destructive file system command detectedassert "rm -rf /tmp/x" in detailFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_ui_permission.py:38 · Destructive file system command detected"momcp", "run_command", {"command": "rm -rf /tmp/x"}Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_permission.py:105 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert evaluate("shell", "rm -rf /", rules).action == DENYFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 57 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for momcp-tui@26.10.633 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim andyjin-2358155969: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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