Skills/PyPI/mojood-proxmox-mcp

mojood-proxmox-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Mojood Connect demo: an MCP server for Proxmox VE (VMs, containers, storage, backups), with confirm-before-change actions." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher askmojood · publishing for 12 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PVE_TOKEN_IDPVE_TOKEN_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: PVE_MCP_PORT, PVE_SAMPLE, PVE_URL, PVE_VERIFY_TLS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso proxmox.com, alpinelinux.org, mojood.app — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names proxmox.com, alpinelinux.org, mojood.app as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PVE_TOKEN_ID, PVE_TOKEN_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mojood-proxmox-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/proxmox_mcp/server.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRun: uv run --env-file .env proxmox-mcp → http://127.0.0.1:8008/mcp (Streamable HTTP)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/seed.sh:15 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /var/lib/vz/dump/vzdump-*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/up.sh:54 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegeslimactl shell "$VM" sudo bash -c 'pveum user list --output-format json | grep -q "viewer@pve" ||Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/up.sh:27 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessecret=$(limactl shell "$VM" sudo bash -c 'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/up.sh:16 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegeslimactl shell "$VM" sudo bash -s kernel < scripts/pve-install.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# (The token secret goes straight into .env below and is never printed.)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/up.sh:56 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprintf %s "$pw" | limactl shell "$VM" sudo bash -c 'pvesh set /access/password --userid viewer@pve --password "$(cat)"'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat > .env << EOFFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/proxmox_mcp/client.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesraise ProxmoxError("PVE_TOKEN_ID and PVE_TOKEN_SECRET are not set (scripts/up.sh writes them to .env)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# first run: install it, give the demo its own Proxmox user with only the rights the tools need, and write .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuv run --env-file .env pytest # unit tests + live tests (run reset.sh first: live tests expect the seed)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/proxmox_mcp/server.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuv run --env-file .env proxmox-mcp --stdio → for Claude Desktop's config fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Secrets (`.env`: the API token secret and the viewer's password) are generated by `up.sh`, git-ignored, and neverFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/proxmox_mcp/server.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSettings (environment, written to .env by scripts/up.sh):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/up.sh:19 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegeslimactl shell "$VM" sudo bash -s pve < scripts/pve-install.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuv run --env-file .env proxmox-mcp # http://127.0.0.1:8008/mcp ; add --stdio for Claude DesktopFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# The API token is generated inside Proxmox and written straight to .env (git-ignored); it is never printed.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/reset.sh:6 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegeslimactl shell pve sudo bash -s < scripts/seed.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_live.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRun: uv run --env-file .env pytest tests/test_live.pyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈581 tok
2 files · 20 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mojood-proxmox-mcp@0.1.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim askmojood: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim askmojoodPropose a patch to the maintainer