Skills/PyPI/mojood-glpi-mcp

mojood-glpi-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Mojood Connect demo: an MCP server for GLPI (IT service and asset management), with confirm-before-change writes." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher askmojood · publishing for 12 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mojood-glpi-mcp -- uvx mojood-glpi-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GLPI_PASSWORDMYSQL_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: GLPI_LOGIN, GLPI_MCP_PORT, GLPI_SAMPLE, GLPI_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso mojood.app — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mojood.app as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GLPI_PASSWORD, MYSQL_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mojood-glpi-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuv run --env-file .env glpi-mcp # http://127.0.0.1:8006/mcp ; add --stdio for Claude DesktopFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/glpi_mcp/server.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRun: uv run --env-file .env glpi-mcp → http://127.0.0.1:8006/mcp (Streamable HTTP)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/compose.yml:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 127.0.0.1:8095 only, in UTC (the seeder and the tools work in UTC). Settings in docker/.env, written by scripts/up.sh.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker/compose.yml:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/reset.sh:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrm -f .env docker/.env docker/backdate.sqlFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/reset.sh:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesset -a; . ./.env; set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/reset.sh:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[ -f docker/.env ] && docker compose -f docker/compose.yml --env-file docker/.env down -vFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/glpi_mcp/server.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSettings (environment, written to .env by scripts/up.sh):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat > docker/.env <<ENVFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# files docker/.env and .env; none is printed.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/glpi_mcp/client.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesraise GLPIError("GLPI_LOGIN and GLPI_PASSWORD are not set (scripts/up.sh writes them to .env)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_live.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRun: uv run --env-file .env pytest tests/test_live.pyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionCLAUDE.md:11 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesof the made-up Harbor Trading (`seed.py`, timeline times set by `docker/backdate.sql`). Private until Hammad sends it; publicFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdc() { docker compose -f docker/compose.yml --env-file docker/.env "$@"; }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/up.sh:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f docker/.env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Secrets (`.env`, `docker/.env`: the API user's and database passwords) are generated by `up.sh`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/glpi_mcp/server.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuv run --env-file .env glpi-mcp --stdio → for Claude Desktop's config fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuv run --env-file .env pytest # unit tests + live tests against the local GLPIFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈539 tok
2 files · 20 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mojood-glpi-mcp@0.1.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mojood-glpi-mcp@0.1.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills