mograph-mcp@0.12.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server to control Adobe Illustrator and After Effects, including an Illustrator-to-After-Effects transfer that keeps bezier curves, strokes and gradients." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MOGRAPH_BRIDGE_AUTHMOGRAPH_BRIDGE_AUTH_TIMEOUTConfiguration, not credentials: CODEX_HOME, CommonProgramFiles, MOGRAPH_AI_APPNAME, MOGRAPH_ALLOW_RAW_SCRIPT, MOGRAPH_EVAL_TIMEOUT, MOGRAPH_LATE_BIND_WAIT, MOGRAPH_LOG, MOGRAPH_MAX_MESSAGE, MOGRAPH_PORT_TAKEOVER, MOGRAPH_TOOLS, MOGRAPH_WS_HOST, MOGRAPH_WS_PORT, ProgramFiles- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso zxpinstaller.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names zxpinstaller.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MOGRAPH_BRIDGE_AUTH, MOGRAPH_BRIDGE_AUTH_TIMEOUT only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"[mcp_servers.{SERVER_NAME}.env]",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Stop that process, or set MOGRAPH_PORT_TAKEOVER=1 to kill "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.log.warning("AE bridge: could not kill PID %s: %s", pid, e)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.continue # never kill ourselvesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["taskkill", "/F", "/PID", pid], capture_output=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(["netstat", "-ano"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# correctly refuses to kill its own process -- and then reportsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.probed by default would kill the very server the user is asking about, and thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(["ps", "-eo", "pid=,lstart=,args="],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=handle, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mograph-mcp@0.12.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.