modelx-mcp@0.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "An MCP server that lets an AI client such as Claude Code read a live modelx session" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.`os.system("printf 12345")` glued its bytes to the front of the response line,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "modelx_mcp.tests.test_lifelib", name],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# print("a", end=""); os.system("printf b") reads "ab", as on a terminal.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("printf 12345") in run_python, was glued to the front of theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."subprocess.run([sys.executable, '-c', 'print(\"FROM-A-CHILD\")']).returncode")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed; sys.__stdout__.write() and os.system("echo ...") put lines onFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.v = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "modelx_mcp", "--help"], env=env(), cwd=PYTHON_ROOT,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.v = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "modelx_mcp", "--version"], env=env(), cwd=PYTHON_ROOT,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.v = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "modelx_mcp", "--max-chars", "100"], env=env(),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-m", "modelx_mcp"] + args, env=env(), cwd=PYTHON_ROOT,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.printed = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "modelx_mcp", "--print-tools"], env=env(),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "modelx_mcp.tests.test_python_tool", name],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for modelx-mcp@0.1.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fumitoh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.