modelscope-mcp-server@0.2.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates with ModelScope's ecosystem." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- modelscope.cn (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to modelscope.cn, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
env_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["uv", "tree", "--depth", "1"], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."detail": "Run modelscope-mcp-server with HTTP transport",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.subprocess.run(["uv", "sync"], check=True, cwd=PROJECT_ROOT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."args": ["run", "modelscope-mcp-server", "--transport", "http"],Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them."label": "uv run modelscope-mcp-server --transport http",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.RUN adduser -D -u 1000 mcpuser && chown -R mcpuser:mcpuser /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for modelscope-mcp-server@0.2.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.