model-radar-mcp@0.15.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server that discovers live catalogs across HTTPS providers and subscription CLIs, ranks models by latency, and helps AI agents pick or compare them." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso x.ai, openrouter.ai, groq.com, vercel.sh, siliconflow.com, nvidia.com, cerebras.ai, sambanova.ai, huggingface.co, deepinfra.com, fireworks.ai, mistral.ai, together.xyz, minimax.io, antigravity.google, hyperbolic.xyz, scaleway.ai, inference.net, sea-lion.ai, google.com, siliconflow.cn, ollama.com, vercel.com, swebench.com, replicate.com, cloudflare.com, perplexity.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.12.0
vet-skills diff model-radar-mcp 0.12.0 0.15.0This version reaches for something 0.12.0 did not: 2 new hosts (vercel.com, vercel.sh). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- vercel.com, vercel.sh
0.12.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
install_hint="curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Install Antigravity CLI: `curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash`.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.install_hint="curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Install Antigravity CLI: `curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash`.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."notes": "Typical: C:\\Users\\<username>\\.claude\\. Credentials: .credentials.json (Linux/Windows).",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for model-radar-mcp@0.15.0 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim srclight: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.