Skills/PyPI/mode-mcp

mode-mcp@0.1.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Mode Analytics — browse reports, manage queries, and fetch results" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nataliemona · publishing for 29 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mode-mcp -- uvx mode-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MODE_API_SECRETMODE_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MODE_WORKSPACE
Where it talks to
mode.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MODE_API_SECRET, MODE_API_TOKEN and talks to mode.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MODE_API_SECRET=mode.com,MODE_API_TOKEN=mode.com -- uvx mode-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:31 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file…ersonal* API tokens (existing ones keep working). Workspace API tokens act with admin access to the whole Workspace, so treat them accordingly — see **Limitations / Safety*…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:98 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file…nal token that's limited to your own permissions, but a Workspace API token has admin access and can delete **any** report or query in the Workspace. That's why the delete …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mode-mcp@0.1.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.