Skills/PyPI/mmcp-core

mmcp-core@2.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MMCP — Multi-Model Collaboration Pipeline. Auto-routes tasks to Claude, GPT, Gemini, DeepSeek with RL routing, cost optimization, and MCP server support." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ragavrida · publishing for 250 daysInstalls 19Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mmcp-core -- uvx mmcp-core
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYDATABASE_URLMMCP_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENSMMCP_MAX_TOKENSOPENROUTER_API_KEYSTRIPE_SECRET_KEYSTRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: MMCP_COMPACT_PROMPTS, MMCP_DAILY_BUDGET, MMCP_DB_PATH, MMCP_DEFAULT_MODEL, MMCP_ENDPOINT, MMCP_HOME, MMCP_PLANNER_MODEL, STRIPE_PRICE_PRO, STRIPE_PRICE_TEAM
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso mmcp.dev, openrouter.ai, railway.app, duckduckgo.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mmcp.dev, openrouter.ai, railway.app, duckduckgo.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, DATABASE_URL, MMCP_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS, MMCP_MAX_TOKENS, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, STRIPE_SECRET_KEY, STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mmcp-core

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmmcp_core/cli/cloud.py:302 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Find .env file in cwd or parent dirs."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_tools.py:68 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceresult = await run_command("rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmmcp_core/cli/__init__.py:174 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_tools.py:68 · Destructive file system command detectedresult = await run_command("rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmmcp_core/cli/cloud.py:304 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesp = os.path.join(d, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmmcp_core/cli/_common.py:98 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load .env file from cwd or parent dirs."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmmcp_core/cli/cloud.py:213 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmmcp_core/tools.py:192 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmmcp_core/cli/cloud.py:212 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint(f" {YELLOW}No .env file found{RESET}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmmcp_core/cli/_common.py:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = os.path.join(d, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmmcp_core/cli/cloud.py:204 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint(f" {GREEN}Found .env:{RESET} {env_file}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈73 tok
1 file · 62 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mmcp-core@2.2.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.