Skills/PyPI/mitre-mcp

mitre-mcp@0.4.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for MITRE ATT&CK framework" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mitre-mcp-contributors · publishing for 544 daysInstalls 546Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mitre-mcp -- uvx mitre-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MITRE_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: FASTMCP_SERVER_HOST, FASTMCP_SERVER_PORT, MITRE_CORS_ORIGINS, MITRE_DATA_DIR, MITRE_ENTERPRISE_URL, MITRE_ICS_URL, MITRE_MOBILE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MITRE_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mitre-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandmitre_mcp/data.py:569 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# A refresh failure must not kill startup when usable cachedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_download.py:438 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkwith patch("mitre_mcp.mitre_mcp_server.httpx.AsyncClient") as mock_client_class:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_download.py:448 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkwith patch("mitre_mcp.mitre_mcp_server.httpx.AsyncClient") as mock_client_class:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_download.py:387 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkwith patch("mitre_mcp.mitre_mcp_server.httpx.AsyncClient") as mock_client_class:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_download.py:423 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkwith patch("mitre_mcp.mitre_mcp_server.httpx.AsyncClient") as mock_client_class:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)mitre_mcp/mitre_mcp_server.py:28 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkimport httpx # noqa: F401 # patch surface: tests target "...mitre_mcp_server.httpx"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_config.py:180 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_download.py:366 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkwith patch("mitre_mcp.mitre_mcp_server.httpx.AsyncClient") as mock_client_class:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mitre-mcp@0.4.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.