Skills/PyPI/mirror-mcp

mirror-mcp@4.2.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Mirror AI MCP Client SDK — Connect to 100+ crypto intelligence tools" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher glasslane-io · publishing for 142 daysInstalls 16Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEYS_PATHAPI_KEYS_YAML_B64AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLESAUTH_ENABLEDAUTH_FALLBACK_PASSWORDAUTH_FALLBACK_USERNAMECHATBOT_AUTH_TOKENCMC_API_KEYCOINMARKETCAP_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEYPOSTGRES_PASSWORDREDIS_PASSWORDUSER_API_KEY_MAX_PER_USERVECTOR_POSTGRES_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: AI_TOOL_CONCURRENCY, AI_TOOL_SEMAPHORE_WAIT, CHATBOT_API_URL, CHATBOT_TIMEOUT, CMC_API_BASE_URL, CMC_TIMEOUT, COINMARKETCAP_CACHE_TTL, COINMARKETCAP_RATE_LIMIT, COINMARKETCAP_USE_SANDBOX, DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, DB_MAX_OVERFLOW, DB_POOL_RECYCLE, DB_POOL_SIZE, DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_VECTOR_SEARCH_TOOLS, ENABLE_WEB_SEARCH_TOOL, MARKET_ANALYTICS_URL, MARKET_DATA_URL, MARKET_DEFI_URL, MARKET_OHLCV_URL, MARKET_SERVICE_TIMEOUT, MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, OPENROUTER_BASE_URL, OPENROUTER_EMBEDDING_MODEL, POSTGRES_DB, POSTGRES_HOST
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai, glasslane.io, coinmarketcap.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/seed_yaml_keys_to_db.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesset -a && source ../../deploy/.env && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:11 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:25 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R mcpserver:mcpserver /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/seed_yaml_keys_to_db.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# With local .env (recommended)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_adapter/__init__.py:9 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkapp.mount("/mcp", MCPAuthMiddleware(_mcp_server.streamable_http_app()))Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/tools/security_tools.py:81 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsPass token_address + chain_id to retrieve the most recent scans for that token.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/auth/api_keys.py:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Set this in the server's .env when config/api_keys.yaml is notFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:10 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/cache/apt/archives/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/server.py:29 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network_mcp_auth = MCPAuthMiddleware(_mcp_server.streamable_http_app())Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mirror-mcp@4.2.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim glasslane-io: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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