Skills/PyPI/mingli-mcp

mingli-mcp@1.3.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Chinese astrology MCP server for Zi Wei Dou Shu and Bazi birth charts" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher spyfree · publishing for 383 daysInstalls 133Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mingli-mcp -- uvx mingli-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALSHTTP_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CORS_ORIGINS, DEFAULT_LANGUAGE, ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT, HTTP_HOST, HTTP_PORT, MCP_SERVER_NAME, RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW, TRANSPORT_TYPE, TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS, WS_HOST, WS_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso 131.com.tw, jianshu.com, t.cn — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names 131.com.tw, jianshu.com, t.cn as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS, HTTP_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mingli-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmingli_mcp/systems/bazi/lib/convert.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detected# subprocess.call("cls", shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_boundary.py:65 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert validate_date("../../etc/passwd") is FalseFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_stdio_transport.py:269 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""A malformed line must produce a -32700 response and NOT kill the loop."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_protocol.py:234 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrequest = {"params": {"name": "../etc/passwd"}}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmingli_mcp/systems/bazi/lib/convert.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedprint(subprocess.check_output("python bazi.py -b " + result, shell=True).decode("gbk"))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_regressions.py:32 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Malformed JSON-RPC must not kill the sessionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mingli-mcp@1.3.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.