mind-mcp@0.2.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MIND Engine — Graph physics, traversal, client" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
'.lock', '.log', '.env', '.gitignore', '.dockerignore',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Environment template: `.env.mind.example`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- Add to .env.example with placeholderFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- Add .env to .gitignore if not alreadyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Mechanical extraction: remove value, add env var read, update .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Force kill an agent."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- mind agents kill: Force kill an agentFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.help="Force kill an agent"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.load_dotenv(project_root / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print(f"{C.RED}Failed to kill agent: {e}{C.RESET}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Update or create root CLAUDE.md with mind section using @ references."""Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Update root AGENTS.md (for Codex)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Update .mind/CLAUDE.md (replace # mind section if exists, otherwise append)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Update manager agent's AGENTS.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Update root CLAUDE.md with mind section (using @ references)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mind-mcp@0.2.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.