Skills/PyPI/milo-mcp-health-feed

milo-mcp-health-feed@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Paid x402 API serving live health-status of MCP servers from the registry. M2M-only — agents pay USDC per call." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher miloantaeus · publishing for 169 daysInstalls 8Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add milo-mcp-health-feed -- uvx milo-mcp-health-feed
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CDP_API_KEY_NAMECDP_API_KEY_PRIVATE_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_REGISTRY_URL, MILO_MCP_HEALTH_FEED_ALLOW_INSECURE_VERIFIER, MILO_MCP_HEALTH_FEED_SKIP_APP_INIT, VERCEL, X402_FACILITATOR_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso glama.ai, coinbase.com, x402.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names glama.ai, coinbase.com, x402.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CDP_API_KEY_NAME, CDP_API_KEY_PRIVATE_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx milo-mcp-health-feed

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmilo_mcp_health_feed/wallet.py:92 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmilo_mcp_health_feed/wallet.py:118 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈68 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for milo-mcp-health-feed@0.1.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.