Skills/PyPI/mikrotik-rest-mcp-server

mikrotik-rest-mcp-server@0.1.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for RouterOS 7 REST API — filtered reads, guarded mutations, timed rollback, container shell" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sogl · publishing for 43 daysInstalls 371Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mikrotik-rest-mcp-server -- uvx mikrotik-rest-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MIKROTIK_PASSWORDMIKROTIK_PASSWORD_FILEMIKROTIK_YOLO_PASSWORD_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: MIKROTIK_BASE, MIKROTIK_LOCAL_ROOT, MIKROTIK_MODE, MIKROTIK_REDACT, MIKROTIK_STRICT_CONFIRM, MIKROTIK_TIMEOUT, MIKROTIK_USERNAME, MIKROTIK_VERIFY_SSL, MIKROTIK_YOLO_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MIKROTIK_PASSWORD, MIKROTIK_PASSWORD_FILE, MIKROTIK_YOLO_PASSWORD_FILE and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mikrotik-rest-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_server.py:294 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/rest/../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addressserver.json:22 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"description": "RouterOS base URL, e.g. https://192.168.88.1"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈68 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mikrotik-rest-mcp-server@0.1.2 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.