Skills/PyPI/midos-mcp

midos-mcp@2026.2.23.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Community Library — Curated knowledge, skill packs, and semantic search for AI coding agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher midosresearch · publishing for 272 daysInstalls 134Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
midos.dev (its own)Also cloudflare.com, astro.build, umami.is — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to midos.dev, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx midos-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)smithery.yaml:42 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkargs: ["-u", "-m", "modules.mcp_server.midos_mcp", "--http", String(port)],Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:72 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Self-hosted</b> — Run locally</summary> ```bash git clone https://github.com/MidOSresearch/midos-mcp.git cd midos-mcp pip install -e . pip install -Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDknowledge/skills/symfony.md:8 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malware- https://endoflife.date/symfonyFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_e2e_tiers.py:421 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresp = call_tool("get_skill", {"name": "../../../etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageweb/src/content/docs/architecture.md:102 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file2. Localhost requests get admin access (bypass)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmodules/mcp_server/handshake_engine.py:120 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Never hardcode secrets -- use os.getenv() + .env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)web/public/.well-known/mcp.json:23 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"note": "Self-hosted only. Start with: python -m modules.mcp_server.midos_mcp --http 8420"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmodules/mcp_server/midos_bridge.py:204 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. **Secrets**: Never hardcode API keys. Use `os.getenv()` + `.env` files.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)modules/mcp_server/midos_mcp.py:16 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkpython -m modules.mcp_server.midos_mcp --http --port 8419Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file paths.github/workflows/midos-ci.yml:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif grep -rP "$PATTERNS" --include='*.py' --include='*.json' --include='*.env*' --include='*.md' --include='*.yml' .; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈362 tok
3 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for midos-mcp@2026.2.23.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim midosresearch: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  4. URL with suspicious TLD≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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