Skills/PyPI/midjourney-proxy-mcp

midjourney-proxy-mcp@0.2.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Midjourney image generation via ImagineAPI" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher youngjaedev · publishing for 306 daysInstalls 25Last detonated 3d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openoffice.org, imagineapi.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files.claude/commands/gh/post-merge.md:93 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file- Example: `git add CLAUDE.md AGENTS.md GEMINI.md 2>/dev/null || true`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tag.claude/commands/tm/convert-prd.md:109 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file</context>Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detected.claude/skills/xlsx/recalc.py:84 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(['gtimeout', '--version'], capture_output=True, timeout=1, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/commands/council.md:188 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFiles: .env*, secrets*, *credentials*, *.pem, *.keyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/commands/ask-gemini.md:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files**Files:** `.env*`, `secrets*`, `*credentials*`, `*token*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/skills/hook-creator/SKILL.md:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files**Block edits to .env files:**Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detected.claude/skills/xlsx/recalc.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(['soffice', '--headless', '--terminate_after_init'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detected.claude/skills/xlsx/recalc.py:92 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tag.claude/commands/tm/convert-prd.md:41 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file<context>Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files.claude/commands/tm/post-merge.md:151 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filegit add CLAUDE.md AGENTS.md GEMINI.md 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/midjourney_proxy_mcp/config.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tag.claude/commands/tm/convert-prd.md:45 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file</context>Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/commands/ask-codex.md:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files**Files:** `.env*`, `secrets*`, `*credentials*`, `*token*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/midjourney_proxy_mcp/client.py:54 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"Set IMAGINEAPI_TOKEN environment variable or pass token parameter."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/skills/hook-creator/SKILL.md:82 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespython3 -c "import json,sys; p=json.load(sys.stdin).get('tool_input',{}).get('file_path',''); sys.exit(2 if '.env' in p else 0)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""프로젝트 루트의 .env 파일에서 환경변수 로드."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:136 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- 로컬: `.env`에 `IMAGINEAPI_TOKEN` 설정 후 `uv run pytest -m integration`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files.claude/commands/gh/post-merge.md:2 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filedescription: Clean up branch and update CLAUDE.md after PR mergeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tag.claude/commands/tm/convert-prd.md:100 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file<context>Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files.claude/commands/tm/post-merge.md:7 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileAfter PR merge, perform branch cleanup, TaskMaster status update, and CLAUDE.md update.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈19,555 tok
8 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for midjourney-proxy-mcp@0.2.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim youngjaedev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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