Skills/PyPI/mfa-servicenow-mcp

mfa-servicenow-mcp@1.25.51

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server implementation for ServiceNow" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jshsakura · publishing for 261 daysInstalls 12,695Last detonated 15 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SERVICENOW_API_KEYSERVICENOW_API_KEY_HEADERSERVICENOW_AUTH_TYPESERVICENOW_BROWSER_PASSWORDSERVICENOW_CLIENT_SECRETSERVICENOW_MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENSERVICENOW_PASSWORDSERVICENOW_TOKEN_URL or --http-auth-token / --client-secret / --browser-passwordConfiguration, not credentials: LOG_FILE, MCP_TOOL_PACKAGE, PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH, SERVICENOW_ACTIVE_INSTANCE, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_DEBUG, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_HEADLESS, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_LOGIN_URL, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_PROBE_PATH, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_SESSION_TTL, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_TIMEOUT, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_USER_DATA_DIR, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_USERNAME, SERVICENOW_CLIENT_ID, SERVICENOW_DEBUG, SERVICENOW_INSTANCE_URL, SERVICENOW_MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, SERVICENOW_MCP_HTTP_HOST, SERVICENOW_MCP_HTTP_PATH, SERVICENOW_MCP_HTTP_PORT, SERVICENOW_MCP_SERVER_NAME, SERVICENOW_MCP_TRANSPORT, SERVICENOW_TIMEOUT, SERVICENOW_USERNAME, TOOL_PACKAGE_CONFIG_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso service-now.com, evil.example, opencode.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names service-now.com, evil.example, opencode.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SERVICENOW_API_KEY, SERVICENOW_API_KEY_HEADER, SERVICENOW_AUTH_TYPE, SERVICENOW_BROWSER_PASSWORD, SERVICENOW_CLIENT_SECRET, SERVICENOW_MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN, SERVICENOW_PASSWORD, SERVICENOW_TOKEN_URL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mfa-servicenow-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.25.49

vet-skills diff mfa-servicenow-mcp 1.25.49 1.25.51

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.25.49 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

1.25.49 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/cli.py:976 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/cli.py:498 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Attempt to load from .env if not provided via args/env vars directly in parse_argsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/servicenow_mcp/cli.py:973 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# from the real environment, not from .env).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/login.py:547 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringnot, and the user can always type the password themselves. Every outcome isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:1201 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Ask a pid to exit. Never uses os.kill on Windows.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codesrc/servicenow_mcp/tools/audit_tools.py:522 · Python exec or eval of computed code"review eval(), innerHTML, or Function() usage immediately."Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/auth/auth_manager.py:704 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# User-chosen base: create it private if missing, but NEVER chmod aFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:1402 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# not permission to kill somebody's browser.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/auth/auth_manager.py:650 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:965 · Python subprocess execution detectedcommand = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603,S607 - fixed argv, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/server.py:878 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# var) must NOT kill server startup — the Playwright lesson: aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/auth/auth_manager.py:2626 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Do NOT close or kill it. Keep login_in_progress=True so thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/tools/repo_tools.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/server.py:905 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Broad on purpose (one broken peer must never kill startup), butFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:1245 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesits own kill policy is how one of them ends up SIGKILLing a browser thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/setup_installer.py:792 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, check=True, timeout=600)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:1225 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run( # noqa: S603,S607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_real_identities.py:248 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_desktop_release.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, cwd=ROOT, env=env, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:1145 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 - executable path comes from PlaywrightFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/servicenow_mcp/tools/log_tools.py:34 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"hint": "Script errors, warnings, gs.log output, platform messages",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/auth/_keepalive.py:102 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# first wait() — otherwise stop() would permanently kill keepalive.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:1208 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run( # noqa: S603,S607 - fixed argv, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/auth/auth_manager.py:1177 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processescrashed mid-login (kill -9, OOM, panic), our own `.lock` fileFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:1203 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesOn Windows os.kill maps every signal other than CTRL_C/CTRL_BREAK to anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:1237 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeslogger.debug("Could not force-kill debug window pid %s: %s", pid, exc)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/servicenow_mcp/browser/window.py:987 · Python subprocess execution detectedstarted = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603,S607 - fixed argv, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_real_identities.py:231 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/servicenow_mcp/auth/_process.py:17 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesbooting on Windows would kill the first host's in-flight login and then refuseFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codesrc/servicenow_mcp/tools/audit_tools.py:74 · Python exec or eval of computed code(r"\beval\s*\(", "eval_usage", "Direct eval() — code injection risk"),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/servicenow_mcp/server.py:456 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file# This used to add "CLAUDE.md asks authors to keep descriptions ≤80Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mfa-servicenow-mcp@1.25.51 as of 14 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jshsakura: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim jshsakuraPropose a patch to the maintainer