metasploit-mcp@3.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Unofficial Metasploit MCP Server (not affiliated with or endorsed by Rapid7) - provides Metasploit Framework functionality via the Model Context Protocol. A fork of GH05TCREW/MetasploitMCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MSF_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: DEBUG_SSE, METASPLOIT_INSTANCE_TIMEOUT, METASPLOIT_MULTI_AGENT, METASPLOIT_PORT_START, MSF_DOCS_PATH, MSF_MCP_RATE_LIMIT, MSF_PORT, MSF_RPC_PROTOCOL, MSF_SERVER, MSF_SSL, PAYLOAD_SAVE_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MSF_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
logger.warning(f"Failed to kill handler job {job_id}: {e}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill_associated_job: If True, also kill the handler job that created this session (default: True).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f"{len(still_running)} handler job(s) still running after kill attempt: {still_running}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# If we have a specific job_id, try to kill itFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# If there's a job ID and a payload LPORT set, kill the jobFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for metasploit-mcp@3.1.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.