meok-mcp-injection-scan-mcp@1.0.14
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP injection / prompt-poisoning / SSRF scanner. 30+ canonical rules covering the April 2026 Anthropic MCP RCE class, mcp-server-git CVE chain, DockerDash injection chain, OWASP LLM Top 10 + GenAI Red Team v1. Scans live MCP /tools/list endpoints OR pasted JSON. Free 5/day, Pro £29/mo for unlimited + signed safety reports auditors and procurement accept. By MEOK AI Labs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MEOK_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MEOK_ALLOW_HTTP_ATTESTATION, MEOK_ATTESTATION_API, MEOK_PAYG_KEY, MEOK_PRO_KEYS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso stripe.com, meok.ai, csoai.org, councilof.ai, proofof.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names stripe.com, meok.ai, csoai.org, councilof.ai, proofof.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MEOK_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"pattern": re.compile(r"\b(?:os\.environ|process\.env|getenv|getEnv|System\.Environment|env\[)", re.I),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.No other findings across 2,106 lines in 34 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for meok-mcp-injection-scan-mcp@1.0.14 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.