Skills/PyPI/mendeley-mcp

mendeley-mcp@0.8.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Mendeley reference manager - search, retrieve, and manage your academic library" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pallaprolus · publishing for 315 daysInstalls 1,286Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mendeley-mcp -- uvx mendeley-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MENDELEY_ACCESS_TOKENMENDELEY_CLIENT_SECRETMENDELEY_REFRESH_TOKEN or --client-secretConfiguration, not credentials: MENDELEY_CLIENT_ID
Where it talks to
mendeley.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MENDELEY_ACCESS_TOKEN, MENDELEY_CLIENT_SECRET, MENDELEY_REFRESH_TOKEN and talks to mendeley.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MENDELEY_ACCESS_TOKEN=mendeley.com,MENDELEY_CLIENT_SECRET=mendeley.com,MENDELEY_REFRESH_TOKEN=mendeley.com -- uvx mendeley-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mendeley_mcp/auth.py:159 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=CREDENTIALS_FILE.parent, prefix=".credentials-")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_stdio.py:21 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:14 · Destructive file system command detectedRUN pip install --no-cache-dir /src && rm -rf /srcFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:1384 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:1420 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 23 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mendeley-mcp@0.8.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.