Skills/PyPI/memory-quality-mcp

memory-quality-mcp@0.2.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A Claude Code MCP plugin that audits and cleans up your AI memory store" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ladyiceberg · publishing for 223 daysInstalls 34Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_api_keyConfiguration, not credentials: CLAUDE_CODE_REMOTE_MEMORY_DIR, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA, CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_language, CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_provider
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso moonshot.cn, minimax.chat, your-api.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names moonshot.cn, minimax.chat, your-api.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_api_key only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx memory-quality-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbenchmark/run_benchmark_scores.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("请先设置 API Key：export MINIMAX_API_KEY=xxx 或 source ~/.env.local")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceskills/hooks/hooks.json:8 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device…_PLUGIN_ROOT}/requirements.txt\" \"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA}/requirements.txt\") || rm -f \"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA}/requirements.txt\"" } ] } ] …Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/memory_writer.py:185 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filelines.append(f" MEMORY.md 索引已同步更新")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedskills/hooks/hooks.json:8 · Destructive file system command detected…_PLUGIN_ROOT}/requirements.txt\" \"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA}/requirements.txt\") || rm -f \"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA}/requirements.txt\"" } ] } ] …Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbenchmark/run_benchmark_scores.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessource ~/.env.local # 加载 MINIMAX_API_KEYFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈549 tok
1 file · 63 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for memory-quality-mcp@0.2.2 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ladyiceberg: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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