memory-map-mcp@1.1.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for persistent AI memory — MongoDB-backed with file fallback" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GITHUB_TOKENMCP_HISTORY_MAX_TOKENSOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_GIT_TIMEOUT, MCP_HISTORY_SUMMARISE_N, MCP_MAX_CHUNK_CHARS, MCP_MAX_ENTRY_KB, MCP_MAX_TURN_CHARS, MCP_OVERLAP_CHARS, MCP_REDACT_PATTERNS, MCP_WORKSPACE_ROOT, MEMORY_MAP_AUTO_MIGRATE, MEMORY_MAP_EMBED_PROVIDER, MEMORY_MAP_MIN_VECTOR_SCORE, MEMORY_MAP_MONGO_URI- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GITHUB_TOKEN, MCP_HISTORY_MAX_TOKENS, OPENAI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Stop load_dotenv from re-populating the env from a real .env in the repo root.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.check_output(cmd, cwd=str(pathlib.Path(__file__).parent.parent),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."""A .env created after the server started must be picked up on the next attempt (#83)."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.MongoDB only — MEMORY_MAP_MONGO_URI must be set in .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# so a .env created or edited after the MCP server starts is still picked up — see #83.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."configuration": ["config", "setting", "env", ".env", "yaml", "toml",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.The cooldown lets a .env created after server start be picked up on theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Simulate the user creating .env mid-session: the next lazy reload pulls in a URI.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."will be unavailable until .env is created/updated (re-checked on each call)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Initial load so module-level env reads below see values from .env. Note thatFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Simulate "no .env yet at server start" — the lazy reload must not see a URI.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.text = "aws key: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.text = "token: ghp_AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUvWxYz1234567890"Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.# .env-style line — generic assignment AND sk-proj key both presentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" not in resultFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for memory-map-mcp@1.1.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kid-sid: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- AWS access key pattern detected≈ +2 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- GitHub token pattern detected≈ +2 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.