memory-layer-mcp@0.8.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Memory Layer MCP for Claude Code — hybrid BM25 + vector search that compounds with usage (Korean ↔ English)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
print(f" {_status_mark(api_ok)} {label:<30} ({'env or .env.local' if api_ok else 'MISSING'})")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_file = src_root / ".env.local"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"or .env.local (embedding provider: {self._spec.name})"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.trap "rm -rf \"$LOCKDIR\"" EXIT HUP INT TERMFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.trap "rm -rf \"$LOCKDIR\"" EXIT HUP INT TERMFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Read ``key`` from the nearest ``.env.local``, walking up from cwd."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.hot_config = _HotReloadableConfig(config, actual_path)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.class _HotReloadableConfig:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.key-resolution the embedder uses (env, then .env.local).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# .env variants: .env, .env.local, .env.production, .envrc, ...Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.parts.append("updated AGENTS.md")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.env_file = current / ".env.local"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.untracked_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.continue # one corrupt line must not kill the cacheFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Key for ``spec`` from the environment, then ``.env.local``."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if kill -0 "$LOCK_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Install: cp scripts/post-commit-hook.sh <project>/.git/hooks/post-commit && chmod +xFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.if [ "$age" -lt 120 ] || { [ -n "$lock_pid" ] && kill -0 "$lock_pid" 2>/dev/null && [ "$age" -lt "$STALE_SECONDS" ]; }; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$LOCK_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if kill -0 "$LOCK_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Hot-reloadable config wrapperFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.re.compile(r"^\.env(\..+)?$", re.IGNORECASE),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for memory-layer-mcp@0.8.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim curiohunter: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.