Skills/PyPI/medmemory-mcp

medmemory-mcp@0.1.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Privacy-first personal health record MCP server — query your health history with Claude" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher priyanshugoel · publishing for 135 daysInstalls 40Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add medmemory-mcp -- uvx medmemory-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEYDATABASE_URLGEMINI_API_KEYOPENFDA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MEDMEMORY_DB_KEY, NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso fda.gov — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names fda.gov as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY, DATABASE_URL, GEMINI_API_KEY, OPENFDA_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx medmemory-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'dotenv'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'dotenv'

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmedmemory/db/database.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(dotenv_path=Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.claude/settings.local.json:49 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"Bash(kill 54257)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.claude/settings.local.json:44 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"Bash(kill 54050)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmedmemory/cli.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = DB_PATH.parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRun once to create the encrypted database and write your passphrase to .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.claude/settings.local.json:12 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"Bash(npx tsc *)",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.claude/settings.local.json:35 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"Bash(npx --no-install playwright --version)",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmedmemory/cli.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("MedMemory is already set up. If you need to reset, delete the database and .env files.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.claude/settings.local.json:45 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"Bash(kill 54053)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmedmemory/cli.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# If running from source, write to project root .env, else write next to the database file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmedmemory/db/database.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(dotenv_path=Path(__file__).parent / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmedmemory/cli.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = project_root / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.claude/settings.local.json:47 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"Bash(kill 54196)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈144 tok
3 files · 58 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for medmemory-mcp@0.1.2 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.