media-agent-mcp@2.8.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol server for media processing with AI tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ARK_API_KEYGOOGLE_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYTOS_ACCESS_KEYTOS_SECRET_KEYTTS_ACCESS_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ARK_BASE_URL, BE_BASE_URL, OMNI_HUMAN_AK, OMNI_HUMAN_SK, RESOURCE_ID, SEEDANCE_EP, SEEDEDIT_EP, SEEDREAM_EP, TOS_BUCKET_NAME, TOS_ENDPOINT, TOS_REGION, TTS_APP_KEY, VLM_EP, VLM_THINKING_TYPE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso bytepluses.com, byteintlapi.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names bytepluses.com, byteintlapi.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ARK_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, TOS_ACCESS_KEY, TOS_SECRET_KEY, TTS_ACCESS_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
res = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("pacman", "sudo pacman -S --noconfirm ffmpeg"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.check_output([ffmpeg_path, "-version"], stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("dnf", "sudo dnf install -y ffmpeg"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("yum", "sudo yum install -y ffmpeg"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("apt-get", "sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ffmpeg"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for media-agent-mcp@2.8.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.