med-lit-mcp@0.4.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for staged, auditable medical literature review that builds an evidence-linked wiki" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
NCBI_API_KEYS2_API_KEYSCOPUS_API_KEYSCOPUS_INSTTOKENSEMANTIC_SCHOLAR_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CODEX_HOME, MED_LIT_CLIENT, MED_LIT_CONFIG_DIR, MED_LIT_LAUNCH_COMMAND, MED_LIT_PROJECTS_DIR, MED_LIT_RESPONSE_BYTES, MED_LIT_SCOPE, MED_LIT_STAGES, MED_LIT_STATE_DIR, NCBI_EMAIL, PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso nih.gov, openalex.org, semanticscholar.org, elsevier.com, doi.org, astral.sh, ebi.ac.uk, europepmc.org, unpaywall.org, crossref.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nih.gov, openalex.org, semanticscholar.org, elsevier.com, doi.org, astral.sh, ebi.ac.uk, europepmc.org, unpaywall.org, crossref.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NCBI_API_KEY, S2_API_KEY, SCOPUS_API_KEY, SCOPUS_INSTTOKEN, SEMANTIC_SCHOLAR_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
echo " curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx = shutil.which("npx") or "npx"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo " curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([*editor.split(), str(path)], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(command, input=stdin, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([npx, "-y", MCPB_CLI, "validate", str(bundle / "manifest.json")], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([npx, "-y", MCPB_CLI, "pack", str(bundle), str(target)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(command, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", timeout=180, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<h1>Setup closed</h1><p class="muted">Run the med-lit install script again when you’re ready to continue.</p>Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", probe, str(path)], timeout=10, capture_output=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([codex, "mcp", "get", "med-lit", "--json"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20, env=os.environ, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.*command, "run", str(path / manifest.get("search_question", "question.json")), "--output", str(output),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."mcp list") printf ' Name Transport\\n ──── ─────\\n med-lit uv run all\\n github npx all\\n' ;;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.process = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "import time; time.sleep(60)"], start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if (output / "strategy.json").is_file() and (output / "manifest.json").is_file():Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.path.write_text('[mcp_servers.med-lit]\nurl = "https://example.org/mcp"\n')Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", probe, str(path)], timeout=10, capture_output=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for med-lit-mcp@0.4.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim junhewk: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.