mcpuniverse@1.1.3
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A framework for developing and benchmarking AI agents using Model Context Protocol (MCP)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ACCESS_TOKEN_DURATION_HRSANTHROPIC_API_KEYDEEPSEEK_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYLOCAL_LLM_API_KEYMISTRAL_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEYTOKEN_SYMMETRIC_KEYVLLM_API_KEYXAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT_COLLECTION_CONFIG_FILE, CLAUDE_BASE_URL, DB_SOURCE, FORMATTED_RATE_BENCHMARK, FORMATTED_RATE_CHAT, FORMATTED_RATE_JOB, FORMATTED_RATE_PROJECT, FORMATTED_RATE_PUBLIC, FORMATTED_RATE_USER, KAFKA_HOST, KAFKA_PORT, LOCAL_LLM_BASE_URL, MCP_GATEWAY_ADDRESS, MQ_TOPIC, OLLAMA_URL, OPENAI_BASE_URL, REDIS_HOST, REDIS_PORT, VLLM_BASE_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso arxiv.org, tiangolo.com, deepseek.com, mistral.ai, openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names arxiv.org, tiangolo.com, deepseek.com, mistral.ai, openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ACCESS_TOKEN_DURATION_HRS, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, DEEPSEEK_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, LOCAL_LLM_API_KEY, MISTRAL_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, TOKEN_SYMMETRIC_KEY, VLLM_API_KEY, XAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Force kill if still aliveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# System dependency: Node.js/npx is required for some MCP serversFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.runner.update_model_endpoint("http://192.168.1.100:8000/v1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpuniverse@1.1.3 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.