Is mcptoai@0.2.6 safe to install?

mcptoai@0.2.6

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "MCPtoAI for Linux: chat with AI on your server from the web, your phone or the terminal" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher bkty-ltd-info · publishing for 39 daysInstalls 872Last detonated 3d ago

What would fix this Watch Dispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to: mcptoai.com (its own)Also nvidia.com, replicate.com, cloudflare.com, deepseek.com, x.ai, groq.com, mistral.ai, openrouter.ai, together.xyz, fireworks.ai, cerebras.ai, moonshot.ai, ssyz.org.tr — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw: nothing has run yet
What we could not test: everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only

t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/service.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(["loginctl", "show-user", str(os.getuid()), "-p", "Linger"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/security_php.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([executable, "-v"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/jobs.py:287 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["taskkill", "/PID", str(pid), "/T", "/F"], capture_output=True, timeout=30,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

HIGH

Privileged sudo commandmcptoai_linux/service.py:73 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges

notes.append("Linger is off: the service stops when you log out. Enable start-at-boot with: sudo loginctl enable-linger " + os.getenv("USER", ""))

Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsmcptoai_linux/sensitive_paths.py:206 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif filename.startswith(".env") and filename not in ALLOWED_ENV_TEMPLATES:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsmcptoai_linux/sensitive_paths.py:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".netrc": "Network credentials",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

HIGH

Privileged sudo commandmcptoai_linux/tools/host_tools.py:544 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# current user already has permission through the OS; sudo is never used.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

HIGH

Privileged sudo commandmcptoai_linux/cli.py:255 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges

check("Start at boot (linger)", service.linger_enabled(), "on" if service.linger_enabled() else "sudo loginctl enable-linger $USER")

Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/tools/host_tools.py:89 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/tools/host_tools.py:545 · Python subprocess execution detected

user = subprocess.run(["systemctl","--user",action,name], capture_output=True, text=True, errors="replace", stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, env=_command_env())

Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsmcptoai_linux/sensitive_paths.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesALLOWED_ENV_TEMPLATES = frozenset({".env.example", ".env.sample", ".env.template"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/cli.py:156 · Python subprocess execution detectedverify = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/cli.py:689 · Python subprocess execution detected

subprocess.run(["journalctl", "--user", "-u", service.UNIT_NAME, "-n", str(a.lines), "--no-pager", *(["-f"] if a.follow else [])],

Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/jobs.py:255 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(args, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=out, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/service.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", *args], env=_env(), capture_output=True, text=True, check=check)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/cli.py:150 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(command)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedmcptoai_linux/tools/host_tools.py:548 · Python subprocess execution detected

system = subprocess.run(["systemctl",action,name], capture_output=True, text=True, errors="replace", stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, env=_command_env())

Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈56 tok

1 file · 49 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcptoai@0.2.6 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%

Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bkty-ltd-info: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim bkty-ltd-info Propose a patch to the maintainer