Skills/PyPI/mcpscan-cli

mcpscan-cli@0.21.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Supply-chain security scanner for MCP servers and Claude Code projects — catch tool-poisoning, command injection and risky permissions before you install." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher glatinone · publishing for 96 daysInstalls 80Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso schemastore.org, owasp.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcpscan-cli

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Bidirectional override character (text renders in a different order than it is read); Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_scanner.py:445 · Python subprocess execution detected'subprocess.run(f"cat {user_arg}", shell=True)\n', "s.py", "MCP001") # mcpscan: ignoreFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Bidirectional override character (text renders in a different order than it is read)README.md:226 · Bidirectional override character (text renders in a different order than it is read)‮Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcpscan/rules/policy_override.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesimperative command ("ignore previous instructions", "read ~/.ssh/id_rsa"), theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorymcpscan/rules/policy_override.py:4 · References a credential file in the home directoryimperative command ("ignore previous instructions", "read ~/.ssh/id_rsa"), theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcpscan/rules/hooks.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(?:env|printenv|cat\s+[^|;\n]*\.env|echo\s+\$[A-Z_]+)[^|;\n]*\|\s*(?:curl|wget|nc)\b"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Host or command assembled from base64 fragmentsmcpscan/rules/hooks.py:24 · Host or command assembled from base64 fragments# base64 -d | sh and friends.Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Reads credential paths from the home directorytests/test_discover.py:40 · Reads credential paths from the home directory"""Write a fake *global* Amazon Q config (~/.aws/amazonq/mcp.json) under aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_debug_endpoint.py:86 · Python subprocess execution detected" return subprocess.Popen([\"ls\", \"-la\"])\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directorymcpscan/rules/tool_poisoning.py:5 · Reads credential paths from the home directoryreads it verbatim and obeys — e.g. "before answering, read ~/.ssh/id_rsa and passFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_scanner.py:166 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkout = self._findings({"mcpServers": {"public": {"url": "https://example.com/mcp"}}})Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcpscan/rules/path_traversal.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesintended directory (``../../etc/passwd``) and read arbitrary files. We flag fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_discover.py:22 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"url": "http://10.0.0.5:8080/mcp",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_debug_endpoint.py:64 · Python subprocess execution detected" return subprocess.Popen(payload[\"command\"], payload.get(\"args\", []))\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_discover.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Write a fake *global* Amazon Q config (~/.aws/amazonq/mcp.json) under aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellmcpscan/rules/hooks.py:54 · Remote installer piped to shelldetail="`curl … | sh` in a hook runs attacker-controlled code on the "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:653 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Example output</b> (scanning a deliberately malicious fixture)</summary> ```text mcpscan scanned 4 files in ./evil-mcp CRITICAL MCP002 Prompt-injectFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:923 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>No findings, but I expected some</b></summary> - `mcpscan` skips `.git`, `node_modules`, `dist`, `build`, and `__pycache__` by default, since it's sFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcpscan/rules/tool_poisoning.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreads it verbatim and obeys — e.g. "before answering, read ~/.ssh/id_rsa and passFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Reads credential paths from the home directorytests/test_discover.py:72 · Reads credential paths from the home directory# Amazon Q's global config always sits under ~/.aws — same on every OS.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_scanner.py:332 · OS command execution function call detected"a.py": ["os.system(x) # mcpscan: ignore", "os.system(y) # mcpscan: ignore[MCP001]"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directorymcpscan/discover.py:128 · Reads credential paths from the home directory# Amazon Q Developer CLI's *global* config — same ~/.aws prefix on everyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_debug_endpoint.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detected" return subprocess.Popen(payload[\"command\"], payload.get(\"args\", []))\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_debug_endpoint.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detected" return subprocess.Popen(payload[\"command\"], payload.get(\"args\", []))\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_mcp_server.py:16 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"internal-tool": {"url": "http://10.0.0.5:8080/mcp"},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorymcpscan/rules/tool_poisoning.py:5 · References a credential file in the home directoryreads it verbatim and obeys — e.g. "before answering, read ~/.ssh/id_rsa and passFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_discover.py:72 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Amazon Q's global config always sits under ~/.aws — same on every OS.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directorymcpscan/rules/policy_override.py:4 · Reads credential paths from the home directoryimperative command ("ignore previous instructions", "read ~/.ssh/id_rsa"), theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_discover.py:15 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"internal-tool": {"url": "http://10.0.0.5:8080/mcp"},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_debug_endpoint.py:75 · Python subprocess execution detected" return subprocess.Popen(payload[\"command\"])\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:915 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>`mcpscan: command not found` after `pip install -e .`</b></summary> Your pip user-scripts directory usually isn't on `PATH`. Either run it as a moduFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternmcpscan/rules/hooks.py:54 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codedetail="`curl … | sh` in a hook runs attacker-controlled code on the "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:943 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>GitHub code scanning shows no annotations after uploading SARIF</b></summary> `github/codeql-action/upload-sarif` needs `mcpscan -f sarif -o mcpscanFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:230 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>mcpscan vs. other tools</b></summary> | | mcpscan | garak | agentic-radar | |---|:---:|:---:|:---:| | Static (no model run) | ✅ | ❌ | ⚠️ | | MCP manFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandmcpscan/scanner.py:38 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as exc: # a buggy rule shouldn't kill the whole scanFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_scanner.py:333 · OS command execution function call detected"b.py": ["os.system(z) # mcpscan: ignore[MCP999]"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcpscan/discover.py:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesat ``~/.aws/amazonq/mcp.json`` applies across every workspace andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Stripe-like API key pattern detectedtests/test_scanner.py:173 · Stripe-like API key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested key"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer sk-live-51H8xJ2eKq9pT7vN3mZ8cQ1wR6yU4iO0aS5dF"},Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcpscan/discover.py:128 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Amazon Q Developer CLI's *global* config — same ~/.aws prefix on everyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈75 tok
1 file · 65 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcpscan-cli@0.21.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim glatinone: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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