mcpresso@0.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Brew your MCP server in under 60 seconds" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYAPI_KEYDATABASE_URLMY_API_KEYPOSTGRES_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MCPRESSO_LOG_LEVEL, MCPRESSO_MODEL, MCPRESSO_REGISTRY_DIR, MCPRESSO_SIMILARITY_THRESHOLD_ADAPT, MCPRESSO_SIMILARITY_THRESHOLD_SEED, POSTGRES_DB, POSTGRES_HOST, POSTGRES_PORT, POSTGRES_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, API_KEY, DATABASE_URL, MY_API_KEY, POSTGRES_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- Test with injection-style inputs: `'; DROP TABLE users; --`, `../../etc/passwd`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."or .env file, or pass api_key= to MCPRepairEngine()."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."subprocess.run(['cmd', 'arg1'], shell=False)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."or .env file, or pass api_key= to MCPGenerator()."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."or .env file, or pass api_key= to MCPGenerator()."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."or .env file, or pass api_key= to MCPTestGenerator()."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."or .env file, or pass api_key= to MCPRepairEngine()."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."or .env file, or pass api_key= to MCPTestGenerator()."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpresso@0.1.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mcpresso: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.