Skills/PyPI/mcpmarket

mcpmarket@0.1.6

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Python MCP server registry and proxy for AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher xray918 · publishing for 486 daysInstalls 23Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcpmarket -- uvx mcpmarket
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PYPI_TOKENTESTPYPI_TOKEN
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso agentrix.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names agentrix.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PYPI_TOKEN, TESTPYPI_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcpmarket

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/agentrix/core/mcp_proxy.py:129 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# NPM package - try to run with npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/agentrix/core/inspector.py:258 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.print(f" npx -y {package}")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageCLAUDE.md:101 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- `NPM`: JavaScript/Node.js packages via npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/publish.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 自动加载 .env 环境变量Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/agentrix/core/mcp_proxy.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.target_process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/agentrix/models/config.py:152 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"env_file": ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/publish.py:21 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,247 tok
2 files · 33 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcpmarket@0.1.6 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.