mcpman@0.3.6
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) Manager - a tool for managing MCP servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYDEEPINFRA_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYGROQ_API_KEYHYPERBOLIC_API_KEYLLM_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEYTOGETHER_API_KEYor--max-tokensConfiguration, not credentials: LLM_API_URL, LLM_MODEL_NAME, LLM_PROVIDER, MCPMAN_STRICT_TOOLS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai, together.xyz, groq.com, hyperbolic.xyz, deepinfra.com, domain.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai, together.xyz, groq.com, hyperbolic.xyz, deepinfra.com, domain.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, DEEPINFRA_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, GROQ_API_KEY, HYPERBOLIC_API_KEY, LLM_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, TOGETHER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
mcpman -c <CONFIG_FILE> -i <IMPLEMENTATION> -m <MODEL> -p "<PROMPT>"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Handle special case for npx commandFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.| `-p, --prompt <PROMPT>` | User prompt (text or file path) |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpman@0.3.6 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.