mcpkernel@0.3.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Open-source MCP/A2A security gateway — policy enforcement, taint tracking, sandboxed execution, deterministic envelopes, and Sigstore audit for every AI agent tool call. OWASP ASI 2026 compliant." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCPKERNEL_HEALTH_TOKENMCPKERNEL_SECRETS_BACKENDSIGSTORE_ID_TOKENVAULT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: AWS_DEFAULT_REGION, AWS_REGION, GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT, MCPKERNEL_DEE__REQUIRE_SIGN, MCPKERNEL_VAULT_MOUNT, VAULT_ADDR, VAULT_NAMESPACE- Where it talks to
- mcpkernel.dev (its own)Also langfuse.com, in-toto.io, oasis-open.org, opentelemetry.io, owasp.org, invariantlabs.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names langfuse.com, in-toto.io, oasis-open.org, opentelemetry.io, owasp.org, invariantlabs.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCPKERNEL_HEALTH_TOKEN, MCPKERNEL_SECRETS_BACKEND, SIGSTORE_ID_TOKEN, VAULT_TOKEN only into requests to mcpkernel.dev (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"detail": f"{p} is accessible by other users (mode {oct(mode)}). Run: chmod 600 {p}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."# MCPKernel local config — see .env.example for the full inventory.\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r"[\u200b\u200c\u200d\u200e\u200f\ufeff]",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.read_file(.env) → http_post(external_url) -- SECRET exfiltrationFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."os.popen": ("STATIC-012", Severity.CRITICAL, "os.popen() allows shell command execution"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.(re.compile(r"\b(env|environment|dotenv|\.env)\b", re.I), FlowCategory.SENSITIVE_DATA, 1.0),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."os.system": ("STATIC-011", Severity.CRITICAL, "os.system() allows shell command execution"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.(r"cat\s+.*(?:\.env|\.ssh|\.aws|\.gnupg|credentials|token|secret|password)", "Sensitive file access", "high"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.arguments={"path": "/etc/passwd"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_file = directory / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.description="Command for stdio transport (e.g. 'npx @mcp/server-filesystem')",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."""Policy hot-reload watcher — monitors policy YAML files and reloads on changes."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.hot_reload: bool = TrueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Use this for any shared-secret value MCPKernel asks for in .env —Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Dangerous shell commands (rm -rf, curl|bash, etc.)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Drop a starter .env so the env-var configuration path is discoverable.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpkernel@0.3.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim piyushptiwari1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.