mcpip-sdk@0.1.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Typed Python client for the MCPIP authorization gateway — authorize every AI action before execution" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCPIP_TOKENor--vault-secret-idConfiguration, not credentials: MCPIP_CONFIG, MCPIP_CONFIG_HOME, MCPIP_CONTEXT, MCPIP_GATEWAY, MCPIP_SANDBOX- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCPIP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"This is the kill switch and it is working. Reactivate deliberately with "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rc = subprocess.call(["bash", str(script)], cwd=str(root))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run( # noqa: S602 - operator-supplied commandFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"(mode {stat.S_IMODE(mode):04o}); run `chmod 600 {path}`"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpip-sdk@0.1.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.