Skills/PyPI/mcpify-openapi

mcpify-openapi@1.19.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Turn any OpenAPI REST API into an MCP server so AI agents can call it — a focused, production-ready CLI with zero runtime dependencies" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 1,131Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcpify-openapi -- uvx mcpify-openapi
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCPIFY_HTTP_TOKEN or --write-auth-env / --write-auth-style / --write-auth-name / --write-oauth2-token-url / --write-oauth2-client-id-env / --write-oauth2-client-secret-env / --write-oauth2-scope / --write-oauth2-client-auth / --oauth2-token-url / --oauth2-client-id-envConfiguration, not credentials: ANSICON, MCPIFY_DEBUG, MCPIFY_QUIET_AUDIT, TERM_PROGRAM, WT_SESSION
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso x.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names x.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCPIFY_HTTP_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcpify-openapi

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_resilience.py:67 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# read timeout: the call that used to kill the serverFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandmcpify/api_server.py:716 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as err: # a crashing tool must return an error result, not kill the sessionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_standalone.py:149 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_resilience.py:231 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Excessive HTML entities detectedtests/test_operations.py:659 · Excessive HTML entities detected — may be obfuscating content'<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">]>'Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandmcpify/tools.py:285 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# circular / unresolvable body schema must not kill the toolFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationmcpify/cli.py:237 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimehelp="watch the spec file(s) and hot-reload the tool surface on change "Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 63 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcpify-openapi@1.19.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.