mcpgantlet@0.5.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP servers ship to production with no way to know whether they survive concurrent load or are safe." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso microsoft.com, api.aws, cloudflare.com, deepwiki.com, gitmcp.io, attacker.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Publish this. A measured negative result about your own work is the single hardest thing for anyone else to out-credential.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."url", ["https://example.com/mcp", "http://192.168.1.10/mcp", "https://gitmcp.io/docs"]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.SCREENCAST: Act 1 — curl the audit against a real public server; the Origin probe fails. Act 2 — the same probe against Cloudflare, which returns 403; the contrFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.MULTIPLE. A single run is noise.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpgantlet@0.5.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.