mcpg@0.8.4
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A production-grade PostgreSQL Model Context Protocol (MCP) server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso diesel.rs, hexdocs.pm, entgo.io, jooq.org, deepseek.com, aliyuncs.com, openrouter.ai, perplexity.ai, x.ai, groq.com, mistral.ai, together.ai, fireworks.ai, deepinfra.com, cerebras.ai, nebius.ai, huggingface.co, github.ai, sambanova.ai, moonshot.ai, z.ai, volces.com, sakana.ai, paradedb.com, sqlc.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# still accessible via ``.env`` for code that needs it.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# through create_server -> AuditedMCPServer -> build_http_app. SameFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.…` | `false` | Expose `alter_system`, `alter_system_reset_all`, `reload_config` (unrestricted mode only; two-step `confirm=true` flow — see [docs/alter-system.md](docs/alter-syst…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.…binaries must be on `PATH`. | | `MCPG_ALLOW_TIMESCALEDB_ADMIN` | `false` | With unrestricted mode + `MCPG_ALLOW_DDL`, expose the destructive / heavy TimescaleDB tools (`drop_chu…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpg@0.8.4 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.