mcpfuzz@0.1.4
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Dynamic security scanner for MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers — actively probes live servers with exploit payloads" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso evil.com, attacker.local, google.internal, ollama.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; OS command execution function call detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."os.system() — direct shell command execution",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.re.compile(r"root:.*:/bin/(bash|sh)"), # /etc/passwd root entryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Classic prefix collision: /tmp is allowed, /tmpevil/../etc/passwd bypasses checkFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("/tmpevil/../etc/passwd", "Prefix collision: /tmpevil/../etc/passwd"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"tools with generic names from different servers can shadow each other, "Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.("AWS EC2 IAM Credentials", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/", "AWS IAM credentials exposure"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("/tmp/../../etc/passwd", "Double traversal from allowed base"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("Azure IMDS", "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01", "Azure managed identity exposure"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("/tmp/../etc/passwd", "Parent traversal from allowed base"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."; cat /etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("AWS EC2 Metadata", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "AWS IAM credentials exposure"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."http://169.254.169.254",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.scan_target "T0221" "4609" "@21st-dev/magic" "npx -y @21st-dev/magic" 3Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."pnpm dlx", "pnpm exec", # pnpm equivalents of npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."npx ", "npx\t", # npm package runner (most common)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."npx -y mcp-mongo-server mongodb://localhost:27017"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."npx -y mcp-postgres $PG_URL"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.("Hex IP Localhost", "http://0x7f000001/", "IP obfuscation bypass"),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.scan_target "T0234" "1605" "tavily-mcp" "npx -y tavily-mcp" 5Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.scan_target "T0213" "6585" "cursor-talk-to-figma-mcp" "npx -y cursor-talk-to-figma-mcp" 2Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Prompt injection patterns: `ignore previous instructions`, `disregard`, `you are now`, `system prompt override`, `<SYSTEM>`, etc.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.scan_target "T0228" "2063" "@perplexity-ai/mcp-server" "npx -y @perplexity-ai/mcp-server" 4Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."npx -y @liangshanli/mcp-server-redis" \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.- Prompt injection patterns: `ignore previous instructions`, `disregard`, `you are now`, `system prompt override`, `<SYSTEM>`, etc.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."npx -y mcp-postgres-full-access" \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."npx -y mcp-postgres-server" \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.scan_target "T0202" "40331" "@chakra-ui/react-mcp" "npx -y @chakra-ui/react-mcp" 1Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."npx -y @bytebase/dbhub --transport stdio --dsn \"$PG_URL2\""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."yarn dlx", # yarn equivalent of npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."npx -y mcp-redis-diagnostics" \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-redis redis://localhost:6379"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."../../../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."npx -y mongodb-mcp-server --connectionString mongodb://localhost:27017"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.- `npx [-y] PACKAGE [args]`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."../../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres $PG_URL"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcpfuzz@0.1.4 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cyberneticsplus-services: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Cross-server tool reference≈ +4 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- Hex-encoded URL≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.