Skills/PyPI/mcpevals

mcpevals@0.1.10

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Pytest-style framework for evaluating Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sarmad-qadri-sarmad · publishing for 690 daysInstalls 3,378Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcpevals -- uvx mcpevals
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENAI_API_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso httpbin.org, this-does-not-exist-999999.tld — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names httpbin.org, this-does-not-exist-999999.tld as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcpevals

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_eval/config.py:83 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-pre-commit.sh:3 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# run `chmod +x ./scripts/setup-pre-commit.sh` first to make it executableFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/format.py:23 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/lint.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/mcp_eval/cli/generator.py:233 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /path" -> ("npx", ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/path"])Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_eval/cli/generator.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_eval/optimizer/predictors.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"OpenAI API key not found. Please set OPENAI_API_KEY in the .env file."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcpevals@0.1.10 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcpevals@0.1.10 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills