Skills/PyPI/mcpdock

mcpdock@1.0.21

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Python CLI for managing MCP servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher yourusername · publishing for 711 daysInstalls 16Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, bun.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcpdock

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; HTTP URL with a raw public IP address; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP address.env:5 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringAPI_BASE=http://47.100.93.168:8000Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:60 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codesh_command = f"curl -LsSf '{install_url}/install.sh' | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP address.env:5 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameAPI_BASE=http://47.100.93.168:8000Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli/config/app_config.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from a .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/cli/commands/uninstall.py:183 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Remove from PID file but don't kill the process automaticallyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/runners/__init__.py:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- command_runner: For running Python/Node packages using uv/npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/commands/run.py:53 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- npx command: "npx:package_name [args]"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/commands/uninstall.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/runners/command_runner.py:117 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeCreates a runner for executing Node.js packages with npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/config/client_config.py:151 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(full_command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, encoding='utf-8')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/runners/command_runner.py:139 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# Build the npx commandFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:25 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([cmd_path, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/utils/process_utils.py:85 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# 如果是npx -y package的格式，实际执行的可能是node命令Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(sh_command, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:60 · Remote installer piped to shellsh_command = f"curl -LsSf '{install_url}/install.sh' | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/runners/command_runner.py:125 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeverbose(f"Starting npx runner for package: {package_name}")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:58 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(ps_command, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈43 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcpdock@1.0.21 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yourusername: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. URL using a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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