Skills/PyPI/mcpcat

mcpcat@0.1.15

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "DEPRECATED — renamed to 'agentcat' (pip install agentcat). Analytics Tool for MCP Servers - provides insights into MCP tool usage patterns" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mcpcat · publishing for 530 daysInstalls 588Last detonated 4d ago
$claude mcp add mcpcat -- uvx mcpcat
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DIAGNOSTICS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: APP_ENV, DIAGNOSTICS_ENDPOINT, DISABLE_DIAGNOSTICS, ENVIRONMENT, MCPCAT_API_URL, MCPCAT_DEBUG_MODE, PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST, PYTEST_VERSION
Where it talks to
mcpcat.io (its own)Also agentcat.com, http-intake.logs — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names agentcat.com, http-intake.logs as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DIAGNOSTICS_TOKEN only into requests to mcpcat.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets DIAGNOSTICS_TOKEN=mcpcat.io -- uvx mcpcat

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_deprecation_notice.py:12 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Cross-server tool referencetests/test_dynamic_tracking.py:363 · Cross-server tool reference — agent may chain tools across untrusted MCP servers# This is a known issue where tools from different serversFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈68 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcpcat@0.1.15 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.